Constitution of the United States/Art. I/Sec. 2/Clause 1 Composition

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Constitutional Law Treatise
Table of Contents
US Constitution.jpg
Constitutional Law Outline
Introduction
The Preamble
Article I Legislative Branch
Art. I, Section 1 Legislative Vesting Clause
Art. I, Section 2 House of Representatives
Art. I, Section 3 Senate
Art. I, Section 4 Congress
Art. I, Section 5 Proceedings
Art. I, Section 6 Rights and Disabilities
Art. I, Section 7 Legislation
Art. I, Section 8 Enumerated Powers
Art. I, Section 9 Powers Denied Congress
Art. I, Section 10 Powers Denied States
Article II Executive Branch
Art. II, Section 1 Function and Selection
Art. II, Section 2 Powers
Art. II, Section 3 Duties
Art. II, Section 4 Impeachment
Article III Judicial Branch
Art. III, Section 1 Vesting Clause
Art. III, Section 2 Justiciability
Art. III, Section 3 Treason
Article IV Relationships Between the States
Art. IV, Section 1 Full Faith and Credit Clause
Art. IV, Section 2 Interstate Comity
Art. IV, Section 3 New States and Federal Property
Art. IV, Section 4 Republican Form of Government
Article V Amending the Constitution
Article VI Supreme Law
Article VII Ratification
First Amendment: Fundamental Freedoms
Religion
Establishment Clause
Free Exercise Clause
Free Speech Clause
Freedom of Association
Second Amendment: Right to Bear Arms
Third Amendment: Quartering Soldiers
Fourth Amendment: Searches and Seizures
Fifth Amendment: Rights of Persons
Sixth Amendment: Rights in Criminal Prosecutions
Seventh Amendment: Civil Trial Rights
Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Ninth Amendment: Unenumerated Rights
Tenth Amendment: Rights Reserved to the States and the People
Eleventh Amendment: Suits Against States
Twelfth Amendment: Election of President
Thirteenth Amendment: Abolition of Slavery
Thirteenth Amend., Section 1 Prohibition on Slavery and Involuntary Servitude
Thirteenth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection and Other Rights
Fourteenth Amend., Section 1 Rights
Fourteenth Amend., Section 2 Apportionment of Representation
Fourteenth Amend., Section 3 Disqualification from Holding Office
Fourteenth Amend., Section 4 Public Debt
Fourteenth Amend., Section 5 Enforcement
Fifteenth Amendment: Right of Citizens to Vote
Fifteenth Amend., Section 1 Right to Vote
Fifteenth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Sixteenth Amendment: Income Tax
Seventeenth Amendment: Popular Election of Senators
Eighteenth Amendment: Prohibition of Liquor
Eighteenth Amend., Section 1 Prohibition
Eighteenth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement of Prohibition
Eighteenth Amend., Section 3 Ratification Deadline
Nineteenth Amendment: Women's Suffrage
Twentieth Amendment: Presidential Term and Succession
Twentieth Amend., Section 1 Terms
Twentieth Amend., Section 2 Meetings of Congress
Twentieth Amend., Section 3 Succession
Twentieth Amend., Section 4 Congress and Presidential Succession
Twentieth Amend., Section 5 Effective Date
Twentieth Amend., Section 6 Ratification
Twenty-First Amendment: Repeal of Prohibition
Twenty-First Amend., Section 1 Repeal of Eighteenth Amendment
Twenty-First Amend., Section 2 Importation, Transportation, and Sale of Liquor
Twenty-First Amend., Section 3 Ratification Deadline
Twenty-Second Amendment: Presidential Term Limits
Twenty-Second Amend., Section 1 Limit
Twenty-Second Amend., Section 2 Ratification Deadline
Twenty-Third Amendment: District of Columbia Electors
Twenty-Third Amend., Section 1 Electors
Twenty-Third Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Twenty-Fourth Amendment: Abolition of Poll Tax
Twenty-Fourth Amend., Section 1 Poll Tax
Twenty-Fourth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Presidential Vacancy
Twenty-Fifth Amend., Section 1 Presidential Vacancy
Twenty-Fifth Amend., Section 2 Vice President Vacancy
Twenty-Fifth Amend., Section 3 Declaration by President
Twenty-Fifth Amend., Section 4 Declaration by Vice President and Others
Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Reduction of Voting Age
Twenty-Sixth Amend., Section 1 Eighteen Years of Age
Twenty-Sixth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Twenty-Seventh Amendment: Congressional Compensation

Article I Legislative Branch

Section 2 House of Representatives

Clause 1 Composition

Clause Text
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

Congressional Districting[edit | edit source]

A major innovation in constitutional law was the development of a requirement that election districts in each state be structured so that each elected representative represents substantially equal populations. Although this requirement has generally been gleaned from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,[1] in Wesberry v. Sanders,[2] the Court held that "construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."[3]

Court involvement in this issue developed slowly. In America's early history, state congressional delegations were generally elected at-large instead of by districts, and even when Congress required single-member districting[4] and later added a provision for equally populated districts[5] the relief sought by voters was action by the House refusing to seat Members-elect selected under systems not in compliance with the federal laws.[6] The first series of cases did not reach the Supreme Court until the states began redistricting through the 1930 Census, and these were resolved without reaching constitutional issues and indeed without resolving the issue whether such voter complaints were justiciable at all.[7] In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the Court used the "political question" doctrine to decline to adjudicate districting and apportionment suits, a position it changed in its 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr[8] and subsequently modified again in its 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause.[9]

For the Court in Wesberry,[10] Justice Hugo Black argued that a reading of the debates of the Constitutional Convention conclusively demonstrated that the Framers had meant, in using the phrase "by the People," to guarantee equality of representation in the election of Members of the House of Representatives.[11] Justice John Marshall Harlan in dissent argued that the statements on which the majority relied had uniformly been in the context of the Great Compromise--Senate representation of the states with Members elected by the state legislatures, House representation according to the population of the states, qualified by the guarantee of at least one Member per state and the counting of slaves as three-fifths of persons--and not at all in the context of intrastate districting. Further, he thought the Convention debates clear to the effect that Article I, § 4, had vested exclusive control over state districting practices in Congress, and that the Court action overrode a congressional decision not to require equally populated districts.[12]

The most important issue, of course, was how strict a standard of equality the Court would adhere to. At first, the Justices seemed inclined to some form of de minimis rule with a requirement that the state present a principled justification for the deviations from equality which any districting plan presented.[13] But in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,[14] a sharply divided Court announced the rule that a state must make a "good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality."[15] Therefore, "[u]nless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such [good-faith] effort [to achieve precise mathematical equality], the state must justify each variance, no matter how small."[16] The strictness of the test was revealed not only by the phrasing of the test but by the fact that the majority rejected every proffer of a justification which the state had made and which could likely be made. Thus, it was not an adequate justification that deviations resulted from (1) an effort to draw districts to maintain intact areas with distinct economic and social interests,[17] (2) the requirements of legislative compromise,[18] (3) a desire to maintain the integrity of political subdivision lines,[19] (4) the exclusion from total population figures of certain military personnel and students not residents of the areas in which they were found,[20] (5) an attempt to compensate for population shifts since the last census,[21] or (6) an effort to achieve geographical compactness.[22]

Illustrating the strictness of the standard, the Court upheld a lower court's decision to void a Texas congressional districting plan in which the population difference between the most and least populous districts was 19,275 persons and the average deviation from the ideally populated district was 3,421 persons.[23] Adhering to the principle of strict population equality, the Court in a subsequent case refused to find a plan valid because the variations were smaller than the estimated census undercount. Rejecting the plan, the difference in population between the most and least populous districts being 3,674 people, in a state in which the average district population was 526,059 people, the Court opined that, given rapid advances in computer technology, it is now "relatively simple to draw contiguous districts of equal population and at the same time . . . further whatever secondary goals the State has."[24]

Although the Supreme Court had suggested for a number of years that claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering might be justiciable,[25] it held in Rucho v. Common Cause that such claims were nonjusticiable, saying that there was no "constitutional directive" nor any "legal standards to guide" the Court.[26] Quoting an earlier plurality opinion on the issue, the Court said that "neither § 2 nor § 4 of Article I 'provides a judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations that the States and Congress may take into account when districting.'"[27]

Voter Qualifications for House of Representatives Elections[edit | edit source]

The Framers of the Constitution vested states with authority to determine qualifications for voters--referred to in the Constitution as electors--in congressional elections,[28] subject to the express requirement that a state can prescribe no qualifications other than those the state has stipulated for voters for the more numerous branch of the state legislature.[29] In Husted v. A. Randolph Inst., the Court stated: "The Constitution gives States the authority to set the qualifications for voting in congressional elections as well as the authority to set the 'Times, Places and Manner' to conduct such elections in the absence of contrary congressional direction."[30]

State discretion is circumscribed, however, by express constitutional limitations[31] and judicial decisions interpreting them.[32] In some cases, Congress has passed legislation to address certain election requirements.[33] In the Voting Rights Act of 1965,[34] Congress legislated changes of a limited nature in the literacy laws of some of the states,[35] and in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,[36] Congress successfully lowered the minimum voting age in federal elections[37] and prescribed residency qualifications for presidential elections.[38] The Court struck down Congress's attempt to lower the minimum voting age for state and local elections.[39] These developments limited state discretion granted by the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, and are more fully dealt with in the treatment of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

While the Constitution grants states authority over voter qualifications, voting for Members of the House of Representatives is also governed by other provisions of the Constitution.[40] For instance, under the Elections Clause set forth at Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, Congress may preempt state laws governing the "Time, Place and Manner" of elections to protect the right to vote for Members of Congress from official[41] or private denial.[42]

  1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (legislative apportionment and districting); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (local governmental units).
  2. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Martin v. Bush, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
  3. 376 U.S. at 7-8.
  4. Act of June 25, 1842, 5 Stat. 491.
  5. Act of February 2, 1872, 17 Stat. 28.
  6. The House uniformly refused to grant any such relief. 1 A. Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives 310 (1907). See L. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment 135-138 (1941).
  7. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932); Mahan v. Hume, 287 U.S. 575 (1932).
  8. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
  9. No. 18-422, slip op. (U.S. June 27, 2019) (holding that political gerrymandering claims are not justiciable).
  10. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
  11. 376 U.S. at 7-18.
  12. 376 U.S. at 20-49.
  13. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967), and Duddleston v. Grills, 385 U.S. 455 (1967), relying on the rule set out in Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967), a state legislative case.
  14. 394 U.S. 526 (1969). See also Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
  15. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969).
  16. 394 U.S. at 531.
  17. 394 U.S. at 533. People vote as individuals, Justice William Brennan said for the Court, and it is the equality of individual voters that is protected.
  18. Id. Political "practicality" may not interfere with a rule of "practicable" equality.
  19. 394 U.S. at 533-34. The argument is not "legally acceptable."
  20. 394 U.S. at 534-35. Justice Brennan questioned whether anything less than a total population basis was permissible but noted that the legislature in any event had made no consistent application of the rationale.
  21. 394 U.S. at 535. This justification would be acceptable if an attempt to establish shifts with reasonable accuracy had been made.
  22. 394 U.S. at 536. Justifications based upon "the unaesthetic appearance" of the map will not be accepted.
  23. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973). The Court did set aside the district court's own plan for districting, instructing that court to adhere more closely to the legislature's own plan insofar as it reflected permissible goals of the legislators, reflecting an ongoing deference to legislatures in this area to the extent possible. See also North Carolina v. Covington, 585 U.S. ___, No. 17-1364, slip op. at 910 (2018) (per curiam) ("The District Court's decision to override the legislature's remedial map . . . was clear error. '[S]tate legislatures have primary jurisdiction over legislative reapportionment,' and a legislature's 'freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an apportionment plan found unconstitutional, either as a whole or in part, should not be restricted beyond the clear commands' of federal law. A district court is 'not free . . . to disregard the political program of' a state legislature on other bases." (quoting Weiser, 412 U.S. at 795; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 85 (1966); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982) (per curiam))).
  24. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 (1983). Illustrating the point about computer-generated plans containing absolute population equality is Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (three-judge court), in which the court adopted a congressional-districting plan in which eighteen of the twenty districts had 571,530 people each and each of the other two had 571,531 people.
  25. The Court held in Davis v. Bandemer that partisan or political gerrymandering claims were justiciable, but a majority of Justices failed to agree on a single test for determining whether partisan gerrymanders were unconstitutional. 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986). See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
  26. No. 18-422, slip op. at 34 (U.S. June 27, 2019).
  27. Id. at 29-30 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
  28. The Voter Qualifications Clause refers only to elections to the House of Representatives as state legislatures originally selected Senators. Adopted in 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment has identical voter qualification requirements for Senate elections. See Seventeenth Amend.: Doctrine on Popular Election of Senators.
  29. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937). See 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 576-585 (1833).
  30. Husted v. A. Randolph Inst., No. 16-980, slip op. at (U.S. June 2018) (holding that Ohio's process of removing voters on the grounds that they have moved did not violate federal law).
  31. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments limited the states in the setting of qualifications in terms of race, sex, payment of poll taxes, and age.
  32. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause has excluded certain qualifications. E.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). The excluded qualifications were in regard to all elections.
  33. The power has been held to exist under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
  34. § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437, 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e), as amended.
  35. Upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
  36. Titles 2 and 3, 84 Stat. 314, 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb.
  37. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 119-131, 135-144, 239-281 (1970).
  38. Id. at 134, 147-150, 236-239, 285-292.
  39. Id. at 119-131, 152-213, 293-296.
  40. In Ex Parte Yarbrough, the Court stated: "The right to vote for members of the Congress of the United States is not derived merely from the constitution and laws of the state in which they are chosen, but has its foundation in the Constitution of the United States." Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663 (1884). See also Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62 (1900); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 492 (1902); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315, 321 (1941).
  41. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
  42. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).