Constitution of the United States/Art. VI/Clause 3 Oaths of Office

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Constitutional Law Treatise
Table of Contents
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Constitutional Law Outline
The Preamble
Article I Legislative Branch
Art. I, Section 1 Legislative Vesting Clause
Art. I, Section 2 House of Representatives
Art. I, Section 3 Senate
Art. I, Section 4 Congress
Art. I, Section 5 Proceedings
Art. I, Section 6 Rights and Disabilities
Art. I, Section 7 Legislation
Art. I, Section 8 Enumerated Powers
Art. I, Section 9 Powers Denied Congress
Art. I, Section 10 Powers Denied States
Article II Executive Branch
Art. II, Section 1 Function and Selection
Art. II, Section 2 Powers
Art. II, Section 3 Duties
Art. II, Section 4 Impeachment
Article III Judicial Branch
Art. III, Section 1 Vesting Clause
Art. III, Section 2 Justiciability
Art. III, Section 3 Treason
Article IV Relationships Between the States
Art. IV, Section 1 Full Faith and Credit Clause
Art. IV, Section 2 Interstate Comity
Art. IV, Section 3 New States and Federal Property
Art. IV, Section 4 Republican Form of Government
Article V Amending the Constitution
Article VI Supreme Law
Article VII Ratification
First Amendment: Fundamental Freedoms
Establishment Clause
Free Exercise Clause
Free Speech Clause
Freedom of Association
Second Amendment: Right to Bear Arms
Third Amendment: Quartering Soldiers
Fourth Amendment: Searches and Seizures
Fifth Amendment: Rights of Persons
Sixth Amendment: Rights in Criminal Prosecutions
Seventh Amendment: Civil Trial Rights
Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Ninth Amendment: Unenumerated Rights
Tenth Amendment: Rights Reserved to the States and the People
Eleventh Amendment: Suits Against States
Twelfth Amendment: Election of President
Thirteenth Amendment: Abolition of Slavery
Thirteenth Amend., Section 1 Prohibition on Slavery and Involuntary Servitude
Thirteenth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection and Other Rights
Fourteenth Amend., Section 1 Rights
Fourteenth Amend., Section 2 Apportionment of Representation
Fourteenth Amend., Section 3 Disqualification from Holding Office
Fourteenth Amend., Section 4 Public Debt
Fourteenth Amend., Section 5 Enforcement
Fifteenth Amendment: Right of Citizens to Vote
Fifteenth Amend., Section 1 Right to Vote
Fifteenth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Sixteenth Amendment: Income Tax
Seventeenth Amendment: Popular Election of Senators
Eighteenth Amendment: Prohibition of Liquor
Eighteenth Amend., Section 1 Prohibition
Eighteenth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement of Prohibition
Eighteenth Amend., Section 3 Ratification Deadline
Nineteenth Amendment: Women's Suffrage
Twentieth Amendment: Presidential Term and Succession
Twentieth Amend., Section 1 Terms
Twentieth Amend., Section 2 Meetings of Congress
Twentieth Amend., Section 3 Succession
Twentieth Amend., Section 4 Congress and Presidential Succession
Twentieth Amend., Section 5 Effective Date
Twentieth Amend., Section 6 Ratification
Twenty-First Amendment: Repeal of Prohibition
Twenty-First Amend., Section 1 Repeal of Eighteenth Amendment
Twenty-First Amend., Section 2 Importation, Transportation, and Sale of Liquor
Twenty-First Amend., Section 3 Ratification Deadline
Twenty-Second Amendment: Presidential Term Limits
Twenty-Second Amend., Section 1 Limit
Twenty-Second Amend., Section 2 Ratification Deadline
Twenty-Third Amendment: District of Columbia Electors
Twenty-Third Amend., Section 1 Electors
Twenty-Third Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Twenty-Fourth Amendment: Abolition of Poll Tax
Twenty-Fourth Amend., Section 1 Poll Tax
Twenty-Fourth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Presidential Vacancy
Twenty-Fifth Amend., Section 1 Presidential Vacancy
Twenty-Fifth Amend., Section 2 Vice President Vacancy
Twenty-Fifth Amend., Section 3 Declaration by President
Twenty-Fifth Amend., Section 4 Declaration by Vice President and Others
Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Reduction of Voting Age
Twenty-Sixth Amend., Section 1 Eighteen Years of Age
Twenty-Sixth Amend., Section 2 Enforcement
Twenty-Seventh Amendment: Congressional Compensation

Article VI Supreme Law

Clause 3 Oaths of Office

Clause Text
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Oaths of Office Generally[edit | edit source]

Congress may require no other oath of fidelity to the Constitution, but it may add to this oath such other oath of office as its wisdom may require.[1] It may not, however, prescribe a test oath as a qualification for holding office, such an act being in effect an ex post facto law,[2] and the same rule holds in the case of the states.[3]

Commenting in the Federalist Papers on the requirement that state officers, as well as members of the state legislatures, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton wrote: "Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and it will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws."[4] The younger Charles Cotesworth Pinckney had expressed the same idea on the floor of the Philadelphia Convention: "They [the states] are the instruments upon which the Union must frequently depend for the support and execution of their powers. . . ."[5] Indeed, the Constitution itself lays many duties, both positive and negative, upon the different organs of state government,[6] and Congress may frequently add others, provided it does not require the state authorities to act outside their normal jurisdiction. Early congressional legislation contains many illustrations of such action by Congress.

The Judiciary Act of 1789[7] not only left the state courts in sole possession of a large part of the jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states and in concurrent possession of the rest, and by other sections state courts were authorized to entertain proceedings by the United States itself to enforce penalties and forfeitures under the revenue laws, examples of the principle that federal law is law to be applied by the state courts, but also any justice of the peace or other magistrates of any of the states were authorized to cause any offender against the United States to be arrested and imprisoned or bailed under the usual mode of process. From the beginning, Congress enacted hundreds of statutes that contained provisions authorizing state officers to enforce and execute federal laws.[8] Pursuant to the same idea of treating state governmental organs as available to the national government for administrative purposes, the Act of 1793 entrusted the rendition of fugitive slaves in part to national officials and in part to state officials and the rendition of fugitives from justice from one state to another exclusively to the state executives.[9]

With the rise of the doctrine of states' rights and of the equal sovereignty of the states with the National Government, the availability of the former as instruments of the latter in the execution of its power came to be questioned.[10] In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,[11] decided in 1842, the constitutionality of the provision of the Act of 1793 making it the duty of state magistrates to act in the return of fugitive slaves was challenged; and in Kentucky v. Dennison,[12] decided on the eve of the Civil War, similar objection was leveled against the provision of the same act which made it "the duty" of the chief executive of a state to render up a fugitive from justice upon the demand of the chief executive of the state from which the fugitive had fled. The Court sustained both provisions, but upon the theory that the cooperation of the state authorities was purely voluntary. In Prigg, the Court, speaking by Justice Joseph Story, said that "while a difference of opinion has existed, and may exist still on the point, in different states, whether state magistrates are bound to act under it, none is entertained by this Court, that state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that authority, unless prohibited by state legislation."[13] Subsequent cases confirmed the point that Congress could authorize willing state officers to perform such federal duties.[14] Indeed, when Congress in the Selective Service Act of 1917 authorized enforcement to a great extent through state employees, the Court rejected "as too wanting in merit to require further notice" the contention that the Act was invalid because of this delegation.[15] State officials were frequently employed in the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, and suits to abate nuisances as defined by the statute were authorized to be brought, in the name of the United States, not only by federal officials, but also by "any prosecuting attorney of any State or any subdivision thereof."[16]

In Dennison, however, the Court held that, although Congress could delegate, it could not require performance of an obligation. The "duty" of state executives in the rendition of fugitives from justice was construed to be declaratory of a "moral duty." Chief Justice Roger Taney wrote for the Court: "The Act does not provide any means to compel the execution of this duty, nor inflict any punishment for neglect or refusal on the part of the Executive of the State; nor is there any clause or provision in the Constitution which arms the Government of the United States with this power. Indeed, such a power would place every State under the control and dominion of the General Government, even in the administration of its internal concerns and reserved rights. And we think it clear that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it. . . . It is true," the Chief Justice conceded, "that in the early days of the Government, Congress relied with confidence upon the co-operation and support of the States, when exercising the legitimate powers of the General Government, and were accustomed to receive it, [but this, he explained, was] upon principles of comity, and from a sense of mutual and common interest, where no such duty was imposed by the Constitution."[17]

Eighteen years later, in Ex parte Siebold,[18] the Court sustained the right of Congress, under Article I, section 4, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, to impose duties upon state election officials in connection with a congressional election and to prescribe additional penalties for the violation by such officials of their duties under state law. Although the doctrine of the holding was expressly confined to cases in which the National Government and the states enjoy "a concurrent power over the same subject matter," no attempt was made to catalogue such cases. Moreover, the outlook of Justice Joseph Bradley's opinion for the Court was decidedly nationalistic rather than dualistic, as is shown by the answer made to the contention of counsel "that the nature of sovereignty is such as to preclude the joint co-operation of two sovereigns, even in a matter in which they are mutually concerned . . . ."[19] To this Justice Bradley replied: "As a general rule, it is no doubt expedient and wise that the operations of the State and national governments should, as far as practicable, be conducted separately, in order to avoid undue jealousies and jars and conflicts of jurisdiction and power. But there is no reason for laying this down as a rule of universal application. It should never be made to override the plain and manifest dictates of the Constitution itself. We cannot yield to such a transcendental view of state sovereignty. The Constitution and laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land, and to these every citizen of every State owes obedience, whether in his individual or official capacity."[20]

Conflict thus developed early between these two doctrinal lines. But it was the Siebold line that prevailed. Enforcement of obligations upon state officials through mandamus or through injunctions was readily available, even when the state itself was immune, through the fiction of Ex Parte Young,[21] under which a state official could be sued in his official capacity but without the immunities attaching to his official capacity. Although the obligations were, for a long period, in their origin based on the United States Constitution, the capacity of Congress to enforce statutory obligations through judicial action was little doubted.[22] Nonetheless, it was only recently that the Court squarely overruled Dennison. "If it seemed clear to the Court in 1861, facing the looming shadow of a Civil War, that 'the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it,' . . . basic constitutional principles now point as clearly the other way."[23] That case is doubly important, because the Court spoke not only to the Extradition Clause and the federal statute directly enforcing it, but it also enforced a purely statutory right on behalf of a Territory that could not claim for itself rights under the Clause.[24]

Even as the Court imposes new federalism limits upon Congress's powers to regulate the states as states, it has reaffirmed the principle that Congress may authorize the federal courts to compel state officials to comply with federal law, statutory as well as constitutional. "[T]he Supremacy Clause makes federal law paramount over the contrary positions of state officials; the power of federal courts to enforce federal law thus presupposes some authority to order state officials to comply."[25]

No doubt, there is tension between the exercise of Congress's power to impose duties on state officials[26] and the developing doctrine under which the Court holds that Congress may not "commandeer" state legislative or administrative processes in the enforcement of federal programs.[27] However, the existence of the Supremacy Clause and the federal oath of office, as well as a body of precedent, indicates that coexistence of the two lines of principles will be maintained.

Religious Test[edit | edit source]

Historical Background on Religious Test for Government Offices[edit | edit source]

England historically required public officeholders not only to swear an oath of loyalty to the Crown, the head of the state-sponsored Church of England, but also to take communion in that church.[28] Religious test oaths were initially required in the colonies, as well, as part of the legal framework supporting state-established churches.[29] The Constitution Annotated discusses the features of historic state-sponsored religions, known as religious establishments, in the context of the Religion Clauses.[30] Looking specifically at religious tests, early Puritans and other colonists believed oaths requiring conformance to Christian values were necessary to ensure that officials were of good moral character.[31] These arguments held particular force for colonies seeking to establish religiously pure communities.[32] Religious minorities protested these oaths, some because of general religious objections to taking oaths, and others because the oaths elevated specific religious views.[33]

As the movement to disestablish state-sponsored religion gained traction in the years following the Revolution,[34] some Founders argued a person's religious beliefs should no longer disqualify them for public office.[35] At the federal constitutional convention, on August 20, 1787, Charles Pinckney introduced a prohibition on religious tests.[36] His proposal read: "No religious test or qualification shall ever be annexed to any oath of office under the authority of the U.S."[37] Pinckney explained that this provision was expected in "a System founded on Republican Principles."[38] He stressed that the new democracy stemmed from the Enlightenment movement,[39] a philosophy that emphasized individual reasoning over central state dogmas and led to more religious toleration.[40] Opposing Pinckney's proposal, Roger Sherman believed the provision was unnecessary because the "prevailing liberality" towards religious beliefs would itself provide "sufficient security" against religious tests.[41] The convention voted to adopt the final version of Pinckney's proposal on August 30, 1787, with the journal recording the vote as unanimous, and James Madison's notes recording North Carolina as the only "no" vote on the Article as a whole.[42]

The constitutional prohibition on religious tests engendered some controversy during state ratification debates, particularly given that most states still retained some form of religious test for public officeholders.[43] Some delegates to state ratification conventions opposed the provision on the grounds that it would allow non-Christians to obtain public office.[44] One Massachusetts delegate claimed, for example, "that a person could not be a good man without being a good Christian."[45] Delegates favoring the provision believed it helped secure religious liberty by preventing government persecution of disfavored sects and government interference in matters of private conscience.[46] One delegate pointed out that requiring a religious test oath would not necessarily ensure officeholders would be of good morals, since "unprincipled and dishonest men will not hesitate to subscribe to any thing" for their advancement.[47] That same delegate argued "that there are worthy characters among men of every other denomination . . . and even among those who have no other guide, in the way to virtue and heaven, than the dictates of natural religion."[48] Ultimately, not only did the states ratify the Constitution's "no religious test" clause, many states removed or loosened their own religious test oaths between 1789 and 1796.[49]

In the 1800 presidential contest between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, a New York minister named William Linn published a pamphlet opposing Jefferson on the basis that he "reject[ed]" the "Christian Religion" and openly professed "Deism."[50] Acknowledging that the Constitution did not prevent non-Christians from serving, Linn nonetheless argued that Jefferson should "set his name to the first part of the apostle's creed" in order to prove his character.[51] Linn and like-minded ministers argued that voters should impose their own religious test--a voluntary restriction that would be all the more "striking" given the lack of a constitutional provision requiring Christianity.[52] Voters rejected these arguments and elected Jefferson president.[53] Adams attributed his electoral loss to popular opposition to a religious establishment, noting presumably false claims that Adams would have "introduce[d] an Establishment of Presbyterianism."[54] In his view, a number of voters "said Let Us have an Atheist or Deist or any Thing rather than an Establishment of Presbyterianism."[55]

Interpretation of Religious Test Clause[edit | edit source]

In a 1787 article defending the necessity of the Constitution's bar on religious tests, Oliver Ellsworth, third Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, defined a religious test as "an act to be done, or profession to be made, relating to religion (such as partaking of the Sacrament according to certain rites and forms, or declaring one's belief of certain doctrines), for the purpose of determining whether his religious opinions are such that he is admissible to a public office."[56] In 1941, the Supreme Court recognized in dicta that the U.S. Constitution prohibited "the religious test oath . . . prevalent in England."[57] Nonetheless, even at that time, a number of state constitutions required office holders to hold a general belief in God's existence.[58]

It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Constitution barred religious tests for state office.[59] In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Court held that a Maryland provision requiring public officeholders to declare a "belief in the existence of God" violated the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.[60] The basis of the decision was the First Amendment's protections for "freedom of belief and religion."[61] However, the Court's opinion also relied on Article VI's prohibition on religious tests to support the idea that religious test oaths were contrary to American tradition.[62] Some other decisions have similarly suggested that the Religion Clauses prohibit laws that institute religious tests for participation in public life.[63]

The provision prohibiting religious tests does not prohibit other types of oaths for public officeholders,[64] although First Amendment protections for speech and association may sometimes limit the government's ability to require oaths that burden those rights.[65]

  1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416 (1819).
  2. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 337 (1867).
  3. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867). See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), in which the Supreme Court held that antiwar statements made by a newly elected member of the Georgia House of Representatives were not inconsistent with the oath of office to support to the United States Constitution.
  4. The Federalist No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton). See also, id. No. 45 (James Madison).
  5. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 404 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
  6. See Art. I, Sec. 3, Clause 1 Composition; id. § 4, cl. 1; id. § 10; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id. art. III, 2, cl. 2; id. art. IV, §§ 1 & 2; id. art. V; id. amends. 13-15, 17, 19, 25, & 26.
  7. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
  8. See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 545 (1925); Holcomb, The States as Agents of the Nation, 3 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law 1187 (1938); Barnett, Cooperation Between the Federal and State Governments, 7 Ore. L. Rev. 267 (1928). See also J. Clark, The Rise of a New Federalism (1938); E. Corwin, Court Over Constitution 148-68 (1938).
  9. 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
  10. For the development of opinion, especially on the part of state courts, adverse to the validity of such legislation, see 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 396-404 (1826).
  11. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
  12. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
  13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622 (1842). See also Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 108 (1861). The word "magistrates" in this passage does not refer solely to judicial officers but reflects the usage in that era in which officers generally were denominated magistrates; the power thus upheld is not the related but separate issue of the use of state courts to enforce federal law.
  14. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 (1883); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 280 (1897); Dallemagne v. Moisan, 197 U.S. 169, 174 (1905); Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 517 (1910); Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235, 239 (1919).
  15. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918). The Act was 40 Stat. 76 (1917).
  16. 41 Stat. 314, § 22. In at least two states, the practice was approved by state appellate courts. Carse v. Marsh, 189 Cal. 743, 210 Pac. 257 (1922); United States v. Richards, 201 Wis. 130, 229 N.W. 675 (1930). On this and other issues under the Act, see Hart, Some Legal Questions Growing Out of the President's Executive Order for Prohibition Enforcement, 13 Va. L. Rev. 86 (1922).
  17. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-08 (1861).
  18. 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
  19. 100 U.S. at 391.
  20. 100 U.S. at 392.
  21. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1876).
  22. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
  23. Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987) (Dennison "rests upon a foundation with which time and the currents of constitutional change have dealt much less favorably.").
  24. In including territories in the statute, Congress acted under the Territorial Clause rather than under the Extradition Clause. New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909).
  25. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992). See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-65 (1982); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106-08 (1972).
  26. The practice continues. See Pub. L. No. 94-435, title III, 90 Stat. 1394, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (authorizing state attorneys general to bring parens patriae antitrust actions in the name of the state to secure monetary relief for damages to the citizens of the state); Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-582, 102 Stat. 2955, 42 U.S.C. § 6992f (authorizing states to impose civil and possibly criminal penalties for violations of the Act); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, tit. I, 107 Stat. 1536, 18 U.S.C. § 922s (imposing on chief law enforcement officer of each jurisdiction to ascertain whether prospective firearms purchaser has a disqualifying record).
  27. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
  28. See Test Act, Encyclopedia Britannica, [1] (last visited July 13, 2022); Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom 252 (rev. ed. 1967). For more discussion of English test oaths, see First Amend.: England and Religious Freedom.
  29. See First Amend.: State-Established Religion in the Colonies. Cf., e.g., Pfeffer, supra note here, at 252-53 (noting that "for a short time Rhode Island was an exception" in not requiring religious tests and giving examples of the oaths required by early state constitutions).
  30. First Amend.: Introduction to the Historical Background on the Religion Clauses.
  31. See, e.g., Frank Lambert, The Founding Fathers and the Place of Religion in America 250 (2003); John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment 50 (4th ed. 2016).
  32. See, e.g., Lambert, supra note here, at 236-37.
  33. See, e.g., Witte & Nichols, supra note here, at 50.
  34. See First Amend.: Virginia's Movement Towards Religious Freedom; First Amend.: Early Interpretations of the Religion Clauses.
  35. See, e.g., Pfeffer, supra note here, at 253; see also, e.g., Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Richard Price (Oct. 9, 1780), [>] (expressing his opposition to religious tests and his hope that states would move further away from them).
  36. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 342 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
  37. Id.
  38. 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 122 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
  39. Id.
  40. See generally, e.g., Shane J. Ralston, American Enlightenment Thought, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [2] (last visited Aug. 15, 2022).
  41. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 468 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
  42. Id. at 461, 468.
  43. See, e.g., Pfeffer, supra note here, at 254.
  44. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), (noting this view disapprovingly); see also, e.g., XXX The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution and the Adoption of the Bill of Rights 403 (eds. John P. Kaminski et al. 2009) (statement of Mr. Abbot) [hereinafter Documentary History of Ratification].
  45. VI Documentary History of Ratification, supra note here, at 1377 (statement of Col. Jones).
  46. See, e.g., VI Documentary History of Ratification, supra note here, at 1421-22 (statement of Rev. Backus); X Documentary History of Ratification, supra note here, at 1531 (statement of Mr. Johnson); XXX Documentary History of Ratification, supra note here, at 404-05 (statement of Mr. Parsons). Accord A Landholder VII, reprinted in III Documentary History of Ratification, supra note here, at 498-500.
  47. VI Documentary History of Ratification, supra note here, at 1376 (statement of Rev. Shute).
  48. Id.
  49. Witte & Nichols, supra note here, at 50-51.
  50. William Linn, Serious Considerations on the Election of a President 4 (1800).
  51. Id. at 32.
  52. Id. at 28; see also Lambert, supra note here, at 276-78.
  53. Lambert, supra note here, at 280-81.
  54. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren (Aug. 8, 1807), [3].
  55. Id.
  56. A Landholder VII, reprinted in III The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution and the Adoption of the Bill of Rights 499 (eds. John P. Kaminski et al. 2009).
  57. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941). See also, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 65 (1946) (noting that a conscientious objector's "religious scruples would not disqualify him from becoming a member of Congress or holding other public offices," citing Article VI's religious tests bar).
  58. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 468-70 (1892) (citing various state constitutional provisions to demonstrate their "recognition of religious obligations").
  59. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
  60. Id. at 489 (quoting Md. Const. Declaration of Rights art. 37).
  61. Id. at 496.
  62. Id. at 491-92.
  63. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702 (1994) (plurality opinion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940).
  64. Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414 (1950).
  65. First Amend.: Loyalty Oaths to First Amend.: Pickering Balancing Test for Government Employee Speech; First Amend.: Denial of Employment or Public Benefits.